Introduction
Spain holds the unemployment record among the major European countries in the 1980s and the 1990s. Emerging from fascism al late as 1975, Spain was the major European transition economy before the breakdown of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Figure 1 demonstrates how the OECD standardised (!) unemployment rate skyrocketed during this transition period to levels above 20 percent. This is a number otherwise just mentioned in Europe in connection with eastern Germany. Indeed, neither Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, nor Slovakia have exhibited unemployment levels of this magnitude.
Apart from macroeconomic explanations for this development (cf. Bentolila and Blanchard 1990) , several 'structural' factors making Spain special have been raised: First, Spain emerged from fascist dictatorship with an extremely low-skilled labour force, with a much higher share of workers with at most primary education than Poland shortly after the beginning of transition (cf. Saint-Paul 2000; Puhani 2002 ). Second, trade union power was re-established in Spain during the 1980s, a period where union power was largely dismantled in the UK, for example (Bover, Bentolila, and Arellano 2002) . Third, employment protection was high, although the reforms of 1984 and 1997 introduced CESifo Economic Studies, Vol. 50, 2/2004 more flexibility in this respect (Jimeno, and Toharia 1993; Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz 2002) . 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 Year Survey Based Standardised Source: OECD.
Hence, during a decade when wage inequality exploded in the US and the UK, most probably due to skill-biased technological change (see Acemoglu 2002 , for a survey), the low-skilled Spanish economy introduced labour market institutions that may be viewed as hostile to wage flexibility. This makes Spain a number one candidate to test the hypothesis of Krugman (1994) , which states that the rise in US wage inequality and the increase in continental European unemployment are 'two sides of the same coin', namely a fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers. In a flexible labour market like the US, such a shock should increase wage inequality. In a labour market with wage rigidities, especially if the workforce is very low skilled, this shock should raise unemployment.
This note attempts to test the "Krugman hypothesis" for Spain using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). I have found no paper in the literature that carries out such a test, although there is probably hardly any other country that provides a nicer natural experiment of introducing wage floors through union power in a period of skill-biased technical change. Instead, there has been more research focus on temporary versus permanent employment in Spain (Bentolila and Dolado 1994; Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz 2002) . I show that data availability is a key constraint to study the interesting Spanish case. The data available to me (the Luxembourg Income Study version of the 1980 and 1990 Family Expenditure Surveys, Encuestas de Presupuestos Familiares, EPF) suggest a potential rigidity in the Spanish earnings structures associated with younger workers. However, persons with a low level of education were not even affected by a negative net demand shock, which can be explained by the massive skill upgrading of the Spanish labour force in the 1980s.
The note is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the data set. Estimates of changes in the earnings and unemployment structures are provided in Section 3, to be followed by the conclusions in Section 4.
Data
Spain is known for lack of good wage information in its generally available data sets for the 1980s and 1990s. The Labour Force Survey does not contain wage data. Administrative data as used in Bover, Bentolila and Arellano (2002) are hard to obtain and also have their conceptual drawbacks. However, the Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares, EPF) contains net labour earnings information and can readily be accessed remotely through the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, see the internet page http://www.lisproject.org/). According to Goerlich and Mas (2001) there are three waves of this survey : 1973, 1980, and 1990 . The LIS offers access to the latter two years. For the purposes of this note, I need at least two years of consistent data across time. Unfortunately, there is only information on total net labour earnings, no separate indication of working hours nor on gross earnings. 1 Worst of all, only household heads and their spouses report the relevant information (earnings, labour force status), but in 1980, education and earnings are only reported for the household head, who is in almost all cases male. For these reasons, consistent information for the purposes of this study is only available for household heads, which factually leads to an exclusion of females from the analysis. Table 1 displays the first set of sample means for the earnings and unemployment regressions to be discussed in the following section. These samples are restricted to male household heads, for the reasons just mentioned. The table clearly reveals that male household heads are a selected group. First, the unemployed rate did not change in between the 1980 and 1990 samples (it stayed constant at 3.9 percent, whereas the OECD survey based unemployment rate rose from 11 to 16 percent during the same period). Indeed, if one includes women and non-household heads with valid information on the variables of interest, the sample unemployment rate rises from 3.8 to 10.3 percent (cf. Table 1 on the all observations sample). This might be a hint that women may have borne the brunt of Spanish unemployment. However, the 1980 survey also heavily under-represents young persons (as Table 1 demonstrates), because they are rarely household heads and hence are often excluded from the 1980 sample due to non-response. Therefore comparisons across time using all persons with valid information in both the 1980 and 1990 waves have to be taken with a fist rather than a grain of salt, as the 1980 sample represents a different population than the 1990 one. On the other hand, only comparing male household heads across time does not seem to be representative for the Spanish labour market. Table 2 illustrates this point by comparing the unemployment rate structure in 1990 between male household heads and all observations. Not only is the average unemployment rate for the full sample much higher. It is also apparent that youth unemployment is by far the highest among all age groups in the whole sample, whereas older workers are more affected by unemployment than younger ones in the population of male household heads. (This is not surprising as predominantly economically successfuland hence employed -males will form their own household and thus select themselves into the sample by becoming a household head.)
Despite of all these problems, I present some exploratory work on the changes in the Spanish earnings and unemployment structures in the following section.
Changes in the earnings and unemployment structures
In order to test the Krugman hypothesis for Spain, I develop a microeconometric approach which measures quantity rationing due to wage/earnings rigidities by unemployment. This idea has been applied by Nickell and Bell (1996) and Gottschalk and Joyce (1997) . My approach is distinguished by previous methodologies in that I control for changes in the structure of labour supply by measuring regression-adjusted ceteris paribus changes in the wage/ earnings and unemployment structures. In addition, I distinguish between the age and education dimensions of skill. Before presenting the empirical strategy, which is quite intuitive, the theoretical justification for this strategy is given. Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS); own calculations.
Theoretical justification
In order to identify relative net demand shocks, I adapt the supply-demandinstitutions framework by Katz and Autor (1999 Z is a vector of demand and/or supply "shift factors", like the size of the labour force, technological change or foreign demand.
In the face of a negative net relative demand shock (formally defined below), a real wage rigidity will cause quantity rationing (i.e. the failure of the market to clear) in the form of unemployment (or non-employment). Unemployment due to rigid wages can be expressed as a function of the vector of wage rates and supply/demand shift factors as
( L×1 vector of latent unemployment rates).
According to this theory, one could measure wage rigidities directly from the observation of unemployment rates. However, in practice frictional unemployment may be higher for some groups than for others. In order to net out this effect, it may be useful to measure wage rigidities by the observation of changes in unemployment and wages between two points in time t (1980 in this paper) and t + τ (1990 in this paper). Using a Taylor expansion one obtains (2) 
U are elements of the Jacobian derivative of U referring to the own wage (the wage in the same labour market), the wages in other labour markets, and the demand/supply shift factors, respectively.
Economic theory allows to impose a light restriction, which is helpful for identification in the econometric analysis: if labour supply and demand schedules are 'upward' and 'downward sloping', respectively, then l , l W U will be positive, because a ceteris paribus increase of the own-wage will increase unemployment in the corresponding labour market. l , l W U will also be positive in other cases, one of them being 'backward-bending' labour supply behaviour in case the slope of the demand curve is less steep than the one of the supply curve and there is no excess demand for labour. It therefore seems innocuous to impose the restriction that l , l W U is positive.
As to the sign of the cross-wage effects j , l W U , economic theory has little to say. This is also true for the sign of the derivative of unemployment with respect to the supply/demand shift variables, j , l Z U , as these variables subsume a wide range of unspecified factors. Note that no assumption is made on the size of substitution or any other demand or supply elasticities. These weak assumptions come at the price of not being able to measure demand or supply shocks and wage rigidity quantitatively. However, as can be deduced from equation (2), observation of the signs of the changes in wage and unemployment rates between two points in time identify the sign of the change in the net supply shift effect (i.e. the net supply shock) 
in 7 out of 9 cases (distinguished by the sign of wage and unemployment changes, similarly as in Table 3 below) (cf. Puhani 2001) . Note that a negative net demand shock is equivalent to a positive net supply shock, i.e. 0 > ξ . I argue that such a qualitative empirical approach with comparatively few assumptions provides a valuable and robust tool for gaining insights into the existence of wage rigidities.
However, the question posed by the Krugman (1994) hypothesis is not whether low-skilled workers experienced a negative net demand shock, but whether they faced a relative negative net demand shock. A relative negative net demand shock for a labour market l means that the net demand shock experienced by this market is more negative than the one affecting the reference market r (the latter refers to an 'average' market and is defined to be the 1980 sample mean of the labour force in this note). Identification of relative net demand (or supply) shocks is based on observing relative wage and unemployment changes: . Using a Taylor approximation as for the derivation of (2) one can write: 
(which is the negative of the relative net demand shock) can be identified. r , l ξ is the basis for the classification into "increasing" ( )
markets of labour market characteristics in Table 3 as will be shown in the following subsection.
Empirical implementation
In order to take the above concepts to individual data, I define a labour market l by its characteristics l x (e.g. age, education, region; the subscript l will be dropped hereafter), and denote the reference labour market r by x (the 1980 sample mean of the labour force). W and U are defined as expected values of the labour earnings W and the unemployment indicator U = 1 (unemployed), , where I is the identity matrix and W is a matrix containing weights, which in my case are the base period (1980 in this case) sample means. This transformation sets the "base category" for all dummy variables equal to the base period sample mean. It can be shown that due to the nonlinearity of the log-linear wage regression and the probit model, this transformation is necessary to interpret changes in the coefficients over time as contributions to rising relative wages or unemployment likelihoods (cf. Puhani 2001) . Hence, instead of classifying each conceivable labour market defined by all dummy variable groups, one can just classify each labour market characteristic k x into one of the nine cells defined in Table 3 , depending on whether it contributed to rising, constant, or falling relative earnings or unemployment likelihood. This is the approach taken in the following subsection.
Results
The estimated vectors ( ) Note that I do not control for gender in the all observations sample, as females in 1980 are a selected group (females in 1980 are only included if they are household heads; in 1990, also spouses are included), so that comparing the 1980 and the 1990 coefficients on female would give no valuable information. I also control for the region of residence, but my discussion will focus exclusively on the age and education coefficients (as these refer to skills, age being a proxy for experience). A comparison between the results of the male household heads and the all observations samples in Table 4 does not exhibit striking differences in the earnings hierarchies between the two samples. However, comparing the unemployment regressions for 1990 clearly confirms the result from the raw unemployment data in Table 2 : among male household heads, the young have an unemployment rate either equal or below (although not statistically significant) average. In the full sample, though, the increased unemployment likelihood of workers aged between 16 and 25 is highly significant with a t-value of 21.5. The fact that the selected sample matters is also illustrated by comparing changes in the earnings and unemployment structures. Changes in coefficients with their t-values are displayed in Table 5 (note that for the sample with all observations, the t-values for the changes in the coefficients are hard to interpret, as the sample population changes between 1980 and 1990; all my following interpretations in this respect thus have to be understood with this caveat). The classification results corresponding to Table 3 from all these regressions are summarised in Table 6 . If the Krugman (1994) hypothesis were true for Spain, one would expect either classification (1): "strongly rigid", (2): "weakly rigid in a decreasing market" or (3): "weakly adjusting in a decreasing market", for the low skill groups. The low skill groups are young workers and those with a low level of education. If only male household heads are considered, I find earnings rigidity (classification 1) for older instead of younger workers. However, in the all observations sample, the opposite is true: insufficiently flexible earnings are now found for younger workers (classification 3). Indeed, a consideration of the cross-sectional results for young workers in the all observations sample in 1990 is revealing (Table 4 ): although observing changes over time might be preferable for the identification of relative earnings rigidities (see the theoretical part above in this section), the data problems that exist here warrant another look at the 1990 cross section. Here the transformed coefficient for young workers is extremely large (0.71) and exceeds those found for Western Germany, Britain, or the United States (cf. the figures in Puhani 2003) . 3 It is thus not plausible to argue that the high ceteris paribus unemployment likelihood of young workers is solely caused by frictional fac-tors. The sheer size of the effect warrants the conclusion that wage/earnings rigidities are responsible for this result. Surprisingly, no earnings rigidities for any low education group can be found in either model. Moreover, the 1990 cross-sectional coefficient for the lowest skill group in the unemployment equation (0.21, see Table 4 ) is smaller those found for Western Germany, Britain, or the United States (cf. the figures in Puhani 2003) . A glimpse at Table 1 suggests an explanation for this finding, which seems at odds with the Krugman hypothesis: Spain has experienced substantial skill upgrading between 1980 and 1990. This might have counteracted the relative demand shock against the unskilled in the same period.
Conclusions
With unemployment skyrocketing to European record levels in the 1980s, Spain seems to be an ideal candidate to test a widely accepted view amongst economists and the general public, namely that continental European unemployment is a result of wage rigidities in the face of negative relative demand shocks against the unskilled (also called the " Krugman (1994) hypothesis"). Using Spanish data provided in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), I have attempted to test this hypothesis with data from 1980 and 1990, two years before and after a significant rise in Spanish unemployment.
Well-known problems with Spanish income data affected my analysis. Although I could establish that ceteris paribus youth joblessness is key to the Spanish unemployment problem, sampling procedures in the data set make it impossible to track the youth unemployment problem across time in a satisfactory way. Although the (probable) rise in youth unemployment is consistent with the Krugman hypothesis, it is astonishing that the low education groups in Spain were not affected by rising unemployment through the 1980s. This demands a qualification of the Krugman hypothesis: supply matters, too. This is demonstrated by the substantial skill upgrading of the Spanish workforce between 1980 and 1990. 1980-1990 1980-1990 1980-1990 1980-1990 1980 1980-1990 1980-1990 1980-1990 1980-1990 Two main policy conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, educational policy matters a lot for wage/earnings differentials. The massive reduction of the share of workers without any formal education helped to keep the relative earnings position of unskilled workers constant. It is interesting to compare the British experience in the 1990s: The British government has done a lot to provide at least some vocational qualification to the unskilled and also to increase the number of pupils obtaining A-levels, which increased the share of workers with a tertiary degree. As a consequence, Britain, unlike the United States, was able to prevent further increases in between-education wage inequalities (cf. Puhani 2003) . Thus, the Spanish policy of skill upgrading in the 1980s helped to prevent earnings inequality increases between education groups. Second, the high and rising youth unemployment is consistent with the theoretical implications of the 1978 legislation which increased dismissal costs significantly (Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz 2002) . Such a reform is expected to reduce new hires thus affecting mostly young workers. This is what we see in the data in terms of the very high ceteris paribus youth unemployment incidence. Indeed, Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) show that the 1997 Spanish labour market reform, which decreased dismissal costs, led to an increase of youth employment. In the light of my results, this means that a cure for wage/earnings rigidity might also lie in a reform of non-wage labour costs, such as dismissal costs.
A general reduction of dismissal costs is expected to increase the relative demand for young outsiders versus older insiders, thus creating higher market wages for young outsiders. In the Spanish case, this seems to have been successful. However, young workers suffered for almost 20 years under an institutional set-up discouraging their employment.
